



THE BIG THINK ON U.S. GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY RESPONSE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the last seventy years, the U.S. global food security and nutrition response structure was developed to combat global hunger and position the U.S. Government (USG) as the international leader in food assistance. Since their creation, U.S. food security programs have contributed to immense progress in international food security and nutrition. Leaning on the depth and breadth of American agriculture expertise and ingenuity, food security programming has bipartisan support and is governed by a complex web of programs and policies built up over decades.

However, **since 2015**, progress on global food security and malnutrition has stalled and rapidly declined, with **over 258 million** people now facing immediate danger from hunger. Currently, multiple overlapping and compounding crises are contributing to an unprecedented scale of global hunger and malnutrition—exposing the lack of resilience and entrenched systemic challenges within the global agrifood system leaving millions of vulnerable people at risk.

The scale of the current global food security and nutrition crisis is renewing attention to the challenge of global hunger. U.S. policymakers are looking for solutions that will confront the current crisis and push past the limitations of the global agrifood system to prevent future crises. However, the myriad of global food insecurity and malnutrition challenges are too complex and interconnected to be addressed by one isolated approach or small shifts to the U.S. response.

To meet systemic challenges alongside immediate needs, prevent further backsliding, and break the cycle of crises, it is time to re-evaluate and recalibrate U.S. global food security and nutrition programs by implementing a sustainable vision to end global hunger. The United States must push more ambitious, holistic reforms to its programs and policies.

Solutions must build upon existing successes and work across humanitarian and development action, focusing on resilient transformations of agrifood systems driven by locally led responses. A collective and unified rethinking is desperately needed to modernize and streamline the U.S. global food security and nutrition architecture.

The U.S. must make agrifood systems resilience the core of its global food security and nutrition programming. This means centering **resilience**—the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses—to reduce chronic vulnerability and facilitate inclusive growth. A resilience focus inherently prioritizes holistic approaches that address the underlying causes of hunger and achieve outcomes across various sectors of foreign assistance. Focusing on resilience will strengthen responders' ability to adapt to volatility and elevate outcomes. It will enable greater clarity of roles and responsibilities of relevant USG entities across food and nutrition programs and give flexibility to make the right interventions at the right time. Yet, any vision with resilience at its core must be developed, planned, and implemented with local and national partners in the lead and with evidence-based interventions to improve and reinforce strategic decision-making.

The current system faces many challenges that hinder the effectiveness and impact of programs, fuel uncertainty for the future of U.S. agricultural leadership, and make it more difficult for the U.S. global food security response structure to adapt to rapidly changing contexts. These include:

- ▶ Increased politicization of U.S. Foreign Assistance
- ▶ Structural overlaps of U.S. global food security and nutrition programs
- ▶ Stagnant investment in long-term development of agrifood systems
- ▶ Entrenched siloing of foreign assistance funding streams contributes to inadequate transitions between programs
- ▶ Barriers to sustained investment in local partners and local leadership
- ▶ Structural limitations for private sector investment
- ▶ Over prioritization of American agriculture and shipping Interests

To better focus the system around resilience, the USG must make numerous mutually reinforcing changes. These recommendations are designed to address the universe of challenges facing U.S. global food security and nutrition programs and provide ideas on how the collective USG response could be strengthened to better meet our community's vision. In the coming months, InterAction and its Members will dive deeper into recommendations to provide greater context and detail. In all, we propose 17 recommendations organized into three areas of impact: Interagency Structures and Strategies, Funding and Programs, and Program Implementation and Planning.



FUNDING AND PROGRAMS

1. Prioritize interventions that build resilience and promote appropriate sequencing, layering, and integration across humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding assistance.
2. Increase investments in systemic, long-term global food security and nutrition funding to build resilience and better respond to cyclical food insecurity and malnutrition.
3. Enhance consistent collaboration across the USG and between USAID Bureaus to promote a unified programmatic approach to address root causes of global hunger and malnutrition and track impact of multisectoral integration.
4. Diversify funding mechanisms so they are fit for purpose and flexible enough to meet changing needs as they arise.
5. Increase research and transparency on program inputs and outcomes to include sharing of best practices, effective program examples, and lessons learned across the departments and agencies involved in the USG food security and nutrition space and related programming.
6. Ensure that more funding makes it to frontline and local implementers as efficiently as possible by streamlining administrative burdens and reducing the use of funding intermediaries.
7. Allow food assistance programs to operate most efficiently by altering programmatic requirements.

INTERAGENCY STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIES

1. Achieve a whole-of-government approach under the Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS) focused on resilience, prevention, and anticipation to strengthen program coordination, collaboration, and alignment.
2. Align relevant sector policies and strategies to ensure holistic and multisectoral approaches to global food security and nutrition program implementation.
3. Leverage research and data to better anticipate and act earlier in response to food and nutrition crises.
4. Improve private sector engagement with the U.S. government and enhance support for local, small, and medium enterprises.
5. Improve research and innovation to drive programming and adaptive learning.
6. Continue to leverage relationships with the World Food Programme and other U.N. response agencies to enhance accountability and sustainability of program impact.
7. Expand USG involvement and call for meaningful reforms at the World Bank and other multilateral development institutions. Reforms include expanding beyond their traditional development financing practices into cross-cutting global issues like food systems security, nutrition, and climate change.

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND PLANNING

1. Partner responsibly and equitably with local organizations to identify food and nutrition needs and ensure local priorities are centered.
2. Leverage existing coordination at the mission level to further plan and account for local capacities, potential shocks, and other vulnerabilities. Systematize country-level partnership mechanisms, coordination practices, and financing tools that can support early action.
3. Better utilize systems approaches to strengthen national and local markets, climate adaptation, and disaster risk reduction.


CONTEXT AND WHY NOW

Over the last seventy years, the U.S. global food security and nutrition response structure has developed to combat global hunger and position the U.S. Government as the international leader in food assistance. But currently, multiple overlapping and compounding crises are contributing to an unprecedented scale of hunger and malnutrition, exposing a lack of resilience and deep, systemic challenges within the global agrifood system. To meet these challenges, prevent further backsliding, build resilience, and break the cycle of crises, it is time to reevaluate and recalibrate U.S. global food security and nutrition programs to forge a sustainable, collective vision for ending global hunger.

Since their creation, U.S. food security programs have contributed to immense progress in combating global hunger. From **1990 to 2015**, the prevalence of undernourished people in low- and middle-income countries was cut nearly in half. **Since then**, progress on global food security and malnutrition has stalled and, in recent years, rapidly declined. The number of people facing acute food insecurity has **more than doubled** since 2019, with over **258 million** people in immediate danger from hunger today.

The stark, rapid reversal in progress **since 2015** is largely fueled by drivers that are expected to grow more pronounced in the years to come: conflict, economic shocks, and climate change. These interrelated and mutually reinforcing drivers have tipped an already fragile agrifood system to the breaking point. Since 2022, the war in Ukraine has spiked global prices of food, fuel, and agricultural inputs, profoundly affecting food import-dependent low-income countries. By the end of 2022, food inflation rose **over 10%** in 38 of 58 countries with food crises, causing increased emergency needs to outpace available funding.

FIGURE 1 PREVALENCE AND NUMBER OF UNDERNOURISHED WORLDWIDE, 2000-2021



Source: FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO, *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022* (Rome: FAO, 2022).

Unfortunately, these shifts indicate trends that will continue for the foreseeable future absent intervention. In 2015, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released the **Global Food Security Intelligence Community Assessment**, stating that “the risk of food insecurity in many countries of strategic importance to the United States will increase during the next ten years because of production, transport and market disruptions to local food availability, lower purchasing power and counterproductive government policies.” Projections estimate that recent spikes in hunger will linger, with nearly **600 million people** still facing hunger in 2030. This is the same level as in 2015 when the **2030 Agenda** launched the **Sustainable Development Goals**. Additionally, food insecurity is not felt equally. An estimated **150 million** more women than men are food insecure, and the gap is growing.

According to the [Global Report on Food Crises 2023](#), while economic shocks surpassed conflict as the main driver of acute food insecurity for the number of countries affected, conflict remained the main driver for the number of people affected in 2022—with 117 million people facing acute food insecurity in 19 countries. Conflict disrupts agricultural production and intensifies hunger when parties engage in actions such as looting, pillaging, blocking humanitarian aid, and intentionally targeting agricultural infrastructure. Conflict also displaces people, forcing them to leave their homes and livelihoods, further exacerbating food insecurity and straining host communities' food systems.

The recently released [Sixth Assessment Report](#) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that even if global warming is limited to 1.5 degrees Celsius—a goal that requires urgent, unified action to [remain feasible](#)—the magnitude of changes will have devastating consequences like massive flooding and drought. The [2022 Global Food Policy Report](#) from the International Food Policy Research Institute paints a dire picture: increased temperatures will directly decrease agricultural yields and indirectly increase food insecurity by pushing people into poverty through extreme weather events, value chain disruptions, and increasingly frequent conflict over limited resources. Today, [nearly 80%](#) of the world's hungriest people live in disaster-prone countries.

The Global Food and Nutrition Crisis by the Numbers:

- ▶ Hunger affected between [691 million and 783 million](#) people in 2022, including [258 million](#) who faced acute food insecurity in 58 countries—up from 193 million in 53 countries in 2021.
- ▶ [Thirty-five million](#) people in 39 countries in 2022 had so little to eat that they were severely malnourished, at risk of starvation and death.
- ▶ In 2022, an estimated [45 million](#) children under the age of five suffered from wasting, a form of acute malnutrition. [13.6 million](#) of these children suffered from severe wasting, the deadliest form of undernutrition.

To respond to these challenges, the United States must push for more ambitious, holistic reforms to USG programs and policies. U.S. food security and nutrition programs are [divided among several agencies](#) with both complementary and competing mandates, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the State Department, the U.S. Treasury Department, and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). These agencies' programs are also funded and structured into separate humanitarian and development interventions, which further divides USG approaches. The siloing of food security programs across modalities and agencies leaves too few actors in the USG who fully understand the nuances and challenges of the collective USG responses or see the whole picture.

The continued division of the U.S. global food security response between humanitarian and development interventions will miss connections between programs and fail to find opportunities for multisectoral integration that would build resilience and produce a greater, more holistic impact. Without improved layering, sequencing, and integration of humanitarian and development programming, the collective U.S. global food security response will be unable to address the underlying causes of food and nutrition insecurity, continuing the cycle of food crises.

As the current global food security and nutrition crisis renews attention to the challenge of global hunger, policymakers are looking for solutions that will confront the current crisis and push past the limitations of the global agrifood system. Several recent legislative, structural, and policy shifts have been made to better align the U.S. global food security response to the current crisis. Unfortunately, these policy and structural adjustments have just scratched the surface of what's needed. Global food insecurity and malnutrition are too complex and interconnected to be addressed by small shifts to a U.S. response that lacks a unified approach.

When the international community faced a similar challenge during the [2008 global food crisis](#), decision-makers responded with an [unprecedented scale-up](#) of funding to meet humanitarian needs, but failed to plan for and invest in a transition to resilience building and long-term food security. The consistent lack of global investment in systemic, long-term agriculture and resilience approaches is a key factor behind the magnitude of the current crisis.

Solutions must build upon existing successes and work across humanitarian and development action focusing on sustained and resilient transformation of agrifood systems driven by locally led responses. A rethinking of approaches is desperately needed to modernize and streamline the U.S. food security and nutrition architecture to expand programmatic impact.

HOW DID WE GET HERE?

A HISTORY OF U.S. GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY RESPONSE

The United States is one of the **foremost donors** of international food assistance and a global leader in the fight against hunger. Leaning on the depth and breadth of American agriculture expertise and ingenuity, U.S. international food security and nutrition programming has strong bipartisan support and is governed by a complex web of programs and policies built up over decades. These programs have several overlapping and competing goals: alleviating hunger and malnutrition abroad, supporting domestic agriculture producers, furthering agricultural trade goals, and supporting the U.S. military maritime industry. As circumstances shifted over time, programs grew in terms of mandates, Congressional and Administration jurisdictions, and political motivations. Despite the complexity, each evolution of the U.S. global food security response strengthened programs to sustainably reach more communities in need and tackle new and ever-changing challenges of agrifood systems.

To understand the current structure and operations of USG global food security and nutrition programs it is critical to understand the history of how approaches developed and expanded over time.

Changing Definitions:

As the understanding of hunger and its causes has evolved over time, so have the terms used to discuss hunger and food assistance. Key terms defined below:

- ▶ **Food aid** refers to in-kind food transfers, whether used directly or monetized.
- ▶ **Food assistance** refers to both in-kind food transfers and cash-based programs that provide the means to acquire food.
- ▶ **Food security** encompasses food assistance but includes agricultural and rural economic development projects, nutritional well-being projects, and other activities that enhance food access and nutrition at the household, village, and country levels.
- ▶ **Agri-food systems** encompass both agricultural and food systems and focus on both food and non-food agricultural products, with clear overlaps. Agri-food systems encompass the entire range of actors and their interlinked value-adding activities involved in the production, aggregation, processing, distribution, consumption and disposal of food products.

Sources: [FAO](#), [Congressional Research Service](#).

Food assistance has served as a tool of U.S. foreign policy since the **early twentieth century**. Following World War I and World War II, the United States carried out large-scale food assistance programs in war-torn Europe. The aid served political as well as humanitarian purposes. Food aid was targeted to Eastern Europe to stop the appeal of Bolshevism after World War I. In 1943, President Roosevelt convened a United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, paving the way for the establishment of the the **Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)** in 1945 as a specialized U.N. agency.


The global food security response structure began with the enactment of legislation now known as the “**Food for Peace Act**” (**P.L 480**) in 1954. This legislation established the first long-term global food assistance program. Due to advancements in agricultural technology, the U.S. had a significant agricultural surplus at the time. The Food for Peace Act was **explicitly written** to address this surplus by “increase[ing] the consumption of United States agricultural commodities in foreign countries” by shipping surplus to “friendly nations.” **In 1966**, Food for Peace funding shifted from Title I, which enabled the sale of agricultural surplus to foreign countries on concessional loan terms, to Title II, which purchases U.S. commodities for donation to food insecure countries. Food for Peace programs were further updated through **subsequent farm bills** to include non-emergency resilience programming aimed at addressing the root causes of hunger and expanding program impact, flexibility, and sustainability while maintaining the requirement that U.S.-sourced commodities be utilized through in-kind assistance.

While Food for Peace remained the cornerstone of U.S. food assistance through the following decades, the international food security response structure shifted to reflect policy priorities of different administrations and better address evolving global dynamics. At the behest of President Dwight Eisenhower, the **World Food Programme (WFP)** was created in 1961 as an experiment to provide food aid through the U.N. system. It formally became a fully-fledged U.N. program in 1965. Standalone programming for global nutrition followed

in the **late 1960s** with a focus on nutrition and dietary diversity in the health of women, infants, and young children. The **International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)**, a specialized U.N. agency established to finance agricultural development projects, was an outcome of the 1974 World Food Conference organized in response to food crises of the early 1970s.

In the U.S., the **1977 Farm Bill** added a research, extension, and education title which promoted agriculture and nutrition research in the federal government and at public land-grant universities. This research has been critical in advancing global understanding of crops, agrifood systems, and adaptation to challenges like climate change. In response to the 1980s famine in Ethiopia, **the Reagan Administration** established **Food for Progress** under the USDA Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) and USAID's **Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET)**.

TIMELINE OF U.S. FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS



In the late 1990s, **Senators George McGovern (D-SD) and Bob Dole (R-KS)** built on their bipartisan collaboration on domestic food and poverty assistance programs to create an international food assistance program that provides school meals and boosts children's literacy globally. This initiative was supported by President Clinton and established under the Bush Administration in the 2002 Farm Bill as the **McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition** program under USDA FAS. This began a new wave of U.S. action and reform efforts to tackle global food insecurity and malnutrition.

In 2005, global prices of nearly all agricultural commodities—like maize, wheat, rice, and other cereals—began to rise and then surged in 2008. Food price spikes **contributed to food insecurity and malnutrition** worldwide, with food riots occurring in several nations. Unprecedented momentum in funding followed to combat rising food insecurity and prevent famine globally. But **funding was allocated unevenly**, and key sectors were underfunded, such as Agriculture and Early Recovery. Ultimately, the investment in resources was not sustained, hindering the realization of long-term food security gains.

In the 2008 Farm Bill, the **Bush Administration** advocated for 25% of Food for Peace funding toward local and regional procurement (LRP) as a quicker and more efficient option than U.S.-grown food. This shift paved the way for the first market-based assistance program, the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP), and the establishment of USAID International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funds dedicated to food security in 2010. Additionally, the **Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP)** was also launched in 2010 by the **G20** as a multilateral mechanism to build resilient and sustainable agriculture and food systems in low-income countries.

Subsequently, the Obama Administration launched the whole-of-government **Feed the Future Initiative** in 2010. The Initiative invests in food security and agricultural development activities in a select group of developing countries to reduce hunger, malnutrition, poverty, and food insecurity. The creation of Feed the Future elevated long-term agriculture development, agricultural research, and resilience-building as priorities for the U.S. global food security response. In 2012, USAID launched the **Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis: USAID Policy and Program Guidance** to promote resilience across programming. The Initiative was codified in law with the passage of the Global Food Security Act (GFSA) in 2016, which also launched the **Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS)** and authorized the EFSP. The GFSA was reauthorized and updated by Congress in 2018 and 2022.

The Trump Administration focused on structural reforms, including when Congress approved the merger of USAID's Office of Food for Peace and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance into the **Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance** (BHA) in 2020. This merger sought to break down the distinction between food and non-food humanitarian response modalities and achieve administrative efficiencies, with **mixed results** to date. In February 2020, **USAID announced** the first-ever Chief Nutritionist to guide efforts and engagement with partners to address malnutrition in low- and middle-income countries.

Changes to the global food security response structure over the last two decades have expanded the tools utilized to respond to food insecurity and malnutrition. Through Congressional reforms, program additions, alterations, and increases in funding for international food assistance programs, market-based assistance has grown. For example, market-based assistance has grown from just 11% in **FY2010** to approximately 60% in FY2020. This growth aligns with **existing humanitarian aid delivery research** and gives recipients greater choice and control over how to best meet their needs by supporting local and regional producers and markets.

Over the last decade, bipartisan members of Congress and the Obama and Trump Administrations pursued further changes to the structure and goals of international food security programs. While the politics and content of these reform efforts were different, the intent and desire to streamline and better coordinate the U.S. food security response structure were the same. Each effort argued that through reform, the U.S. response to food insecurity and malnutrition could be strengthened to expand impact, improve efficiencies, and better utilize financial resources. However, none of the most recent reform efforts have been fully adopted into law.

The Obama Administration's **FY2014 budget** request proposed to shift funds from Food for Peace Title II to several State and Foreign Operations (SFOPS) appropriations accounts like International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and Development Assistance (DA). This proposal intended to allow "the use of the right tool at the right time for responding to emergencies and chronic food insecurity." The proposal would have increased the use of market-based approaches in emergency contexts and established a Community Development and Resilience Fund within DA. While aspects of this proposal were introduced through legislation like the 2014 Farm Bill and Global Food Security Act, the proposal was not enacted in its entirety. Funding for global food security programs remains bifurcated between SFOPS and Agriculture appropriations bills.

In 2018, in parallel with Farm Bill negotiations, Senators Bob Corker (R-TN) and Chris Coons (D-DE), and Representatives Ed Royce (R-CA) and Earl Blumenauer (D-OR), introduced the **Food for Peace Modernization Act**. This bill proposed greater efficiencies in the Food for Peace program by increasing the flexibility to use local and regional procurement of commodities, changing cargo preference regulations, and eliminating monetization requirements. Components of this bill, including elimination of monetization requirements, were included in the 2018 Farm Bill. This proposed legislation was built on years of Congressional leadership on food aid reform efforts, including the **Royce-Engel Amendment** to the Farm Bill in 2013.

The Trump Administration proposed to alter significantly—and in some cases, eliminate entirely—U.S. food assistance and humanitarian programs in their budget requests. This effort focused on eliminating funding for the McGovern-Dole and Food for Peace Title II programs and funding all international emergency food assistance through IDA within the SFOPS appropriation. This proposal was offered in conjunction with across-the-board funding cuts to development and humanitarian programs, including food security and nutrition programs. This effort included a 50% cut to funding for Feed the Future, arguing that enough efficiencies would be achieved to justify massive funding cuts. Congress **did not adopt** these proposals.

In 2021, the **U.S. International Development Finance Corporation** (DFC) announced plans to invest **\$1 billion** in food security and agriculture projects over five years to accelerate progress toward ending hunger and malnutrition and building more sustainable, equitable, and resilient food systems. Two years later, the DFC is on track to **surpass the billion-dollar goal**. Created in 2018 to consolidate the USG's development finance capabilities and enhance the tools available to partner with the private sector, a key aspect of the DFC's **Roadmap for Impact** is food security and agriculture. To achieve this goal, the DFC "seeks to provide financing, technical assistance, and insurance to private sector projects in developing countries that advance agricultural production, irrigation, food processing, food storage, shipping and logistics, and fintech related to global food systems."

Despite this attention to global food security and nutrition across administrations and Congressional terms, global hunger has been rising in recent years, with the risks of multiple famines ringing alarm bells. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in **February 2022** further intensified the challenge, sparking widespread impacts on global agrifood systems, agricultural markets, food security, and nutrition. Global **food prices spiked**, and urgently needed emergency humanitarian food assistance was stalled.

In response, the USG escalated its efforts to respond to global food insecurity and malnutrition. In May 2022, Congress passed a supplemental funding bill that supplied **\$5 billion** in humanitarian assistance "to address growing global food security needs in Ukraine and countries impacted by the conflict there." **Seven hundred and sixty million dollars** of supplemental funds were implemented through Feed the Future to mitigate a global fertilizer shortage; support the resilience of smallholder farmers, including women, through access to improved agricultural technologies, inputs, financing, and markets; cushion the macroeconomic shock and impact on poor

people; and sustain high-level global political engagement. In July 2022, USAID also announced that **\$200 million** of the supplemental funds would be directed to increase children’s access to malnutrition treatment, including ready-to-use therapeutic foods (RUTFs), in response to the rapid increase of children suffering from wasting in the 15 countries hit hardest by the global crisis. Additional resources were also provided to combat global food insecurity and malnutrition in the December 2022 passage of the FY2023 Omnibus.

To simultaneously strengthen U.S. global food security response efforts, the Biden Administration launched or expanded several initiatives to combat global food insecurity and malnutrition. The State Department’s **Office of Global Food Security** reconstituted to advance diplomatic efforts to combat global hunger, help to unify the U.S. response to the global food crisis and coordinate engagement on food systems, food security, and nutrition in bilateral, multilateral, and regional fora. Dr. Cary Fowler was selected to lead the office as **U.S. Special Envoy for Global Food Security** at the State Department and serve as the Feed the Future Deputy Coordinator for Diplomacy in May 2022.

USAID expanded the number of target countries for **Feed the Future** in June 2022 from 12 to 20. This move strengthened Feed the Future’s global footprint and enhanced the program’s ability to drive economic growth and transform agrifood systems. USAID also finalized its selection of **18 Nutrition Priority Countries** to focus USAID nutrition investments in the health and agriculture sectors and leverage country commitments to nutrition. In September 2022, **Dina Esposito** was appointed as USAID’s Global Food Crisis Coordinator in addition to her role as the Assistant to the Administrator for the RFS Bureau at USAID and Feed the Future Deputy Coordinator for Development.

In the same month, the White House unveiled the **President’s Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience** (PREPARE) Action Plan. PREPARE is the cornerstone of the U.S. foreign policy response to address the increasingly devastating impacts of the global climate crisis. The Action Plan articulated details of the whole-of-government effort and highlighted the need for a focus on resilience to draw better linkages across the USG to global food and climate crises.

At the U.N. Climate Change Conference (COP27) in November 2022, the Biden Administration drew further connections between food security and climate with the USDA announcement that the U.S. would host the **Agriculture Innovation Mission for Climate Summit**. AIM4C, a joint initiative by the U.S. and United Arab Emirates, created a time-bound initiative to address climate change and global hunger by mobilizing stakeholders to significantly increase investment in and support for climate-smart agriculture and agrifood systems innovation.

In 2023, Congress and the Biden Administration proposed several new strategies and investments to combat global hunger and advance connections between food security, nutrition, and other related sectors. In January, Special Envoy Fowler announced the **Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils** (VACS) to help prepare the African continent’s food systems for challenges posed by climate change. The multi-phase initiative is grounded in the objectives of Feed the Future to elevate a systemic focus on building soil health and increasing the resilience of key indigenous food crops. VACS will identify the most nutritious crops in each of the African Union’s five subregions, assess the expected challenges posed to those crops, and boost public and private investments to these adapt crops to anticipated effects of climate change.



In April, USAID launched **Generating Resilience and Opportunities for Women** (GROW), designed to tackle urgent challenges women face in food and water systems, unlock economic opportunities for women, and improve food security, resilience, and economic growth. Senator Lindsey Graham (R- SC) proposed The **Global Food Security Fund** to leverage contributions from donor countries and the private sector to create measurable food security outcomes. During a Congressional hearing in April 2023, Senator Graham outlined that this new fund would be modeled after the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria—a public-private partnership—to fund research and programs to increase food production.

As of publication, none of the 2023 proposals are funded or authorized. These recent steps, and elevated U.S. leadership, are important advancements to the USG’s global food security response. Still, these new reforms continue to target individual agencies or programs instead of advancing a collective vision for the U.S. response to food insecurity and malnutrition.



CURRENT U.S. FOOD SECURITY STRUCTURE

U.S. international food security programs primarily provide two types of bilateral assistance. The first is emergency relief to populations impacted by crises, such as conflicts or natural disasters, to address chronic food insecurity and malnutrition and help populations emerging from conflict or crisis build resilience to potential shocks and threats to food supplies. The second is long-term multisectoral agriculture programs that invest in preventive nutrition solutions, strengthen the capacity of agrifood systems, and invest in research to strengthen the resilience, nutritional value, and yields of crops around the globe. Additionally, a small number of resources target challenges between traditional responses and build the resilience capacity of individuals, communities, and food. These programs are all implemented through partner organizations and multilateral institutions, like the World Food Programme, with oversight and program funding from USAID or USDA.

Below, the primary food security and nutrition focused programs are outlined with who administers them.

USAID Administered:	USDA Administered:
<p>The Feed the Future Initiative is the flagship USG initiative to end global hunger. Led by USAID and driven by collaborative partnerships across public and private sectors, Feed the Future addresses the root causes of poverty and hunger and draws upon the skills, expertise, and resources of 11 USG partner agencies.</p>	<p>Food for Progress programs focus on improving agricultural productivity and expanding agricultural trade. USDA donates U.S. agricultural commodities, which can be distributed as food or monetized to fund projects by selling them locally.</p>
<p>Food for Peace Title II Emergency provides emergency assistance to communities affected by recurrent natural disasters, conflict, and chronic food insecurity. In FY2022, emergency programs accounted for 87% of total Food for Peace funding. Food for Peace was authorized in the 1954 Food for Peace Act, requires reauthorization through the Farm Bill, and is funded through annual Agriculture appropriations bills.</p>	<p>The McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition program aims to improve child nutrition and school enrollment, attendance, and performance, particularly among girls. It provides donated U.S. commodities to schools in target countries. McGovern-Dole is authorized in the Farm Bill and is funded through Agriculture appropriations bills.</p>
<p>Food for Peace Title II Nonemergency addresses the root causes of food insecurity and malnutrition—including amongst young children and pregnant women—helping to build resilience within communities. By investing in savings groups, access to agricultural loans, education on water management and risk management practices, non-emergency programs proactively prevent future hunger crises by aiming to build self-reliance. In FY2022, nonemergency programs were 13% of the overall Food for Peace budget. This “safe box” cannot be less than \$365 million.</p>	<p>The Local and Regional Food Aid Procurement Program (LRP) finances the procurement of locally sourced food, typically to supplement U.S. commodities in the McGovern-Dole program. LRP supports local agriculture and food systems, helping to build community resilience and eventually graduate the program from U.S. assistance.</p>

USAID Administered:	USDA Administered:
<p>Global Health Nutrition programs use evidence-based interventions foundational to a child’s life, focusing on nutrition-specific interventions that address the immediate, health-related determinants of undernutrition. They prevent and treat stunting, wasting (acute malnutrition), and micronutrient deficiencies, such as anemia. These programs prevent child and maternal deaths and support long-term health, cognitive development, and physical growth. Implemented by USAID’s Global Health Bureau in 18 priority and strategic support countries, activities include nutrition education, technical assistance, and the direct delivery of services to women and children, such as prenatal vitamins, breastfeeding support, micronutrient supplementation, and ready-to-use therapeutic foods.</p>	
<p>The Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) is a market-based emergency assistance program. FY2022 EFSP assistance was provided in 55 countries, with LRIP used most frequently, closely followed by food vouchers and cash transfers. The EFSP is administered by USAID and is funded through the International Development Assistance account.</p>	
<p>Farmer-to-Farmer (Food for Peace Title V) technical assistance focuses on financing short-term volunteer placements of people with agricultural or food system expertise in developing countries. Congress established the program through the 1966 Food for Peace Act reauthorization.</p>	
<p>The Community Development Fund (CDF) supports USAID’s Resilience Food Security Activities (RFSAs) in Feed the Future target countries. CDF funds are frequently used in conjunction with Food for Peace Title II nonemergency funds to cover programmatic costs.</p>	
<p>The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT) holds funds in reserve for deployment in times of extraordinary humanitarian need. It can supplement Food for Peace Title II emergency assistance when funds do not meet needs in a given year, allowing for speed and flexibility without relying on supplemental appropriations from Congress. The Secretary of Agriculture governs the Trust and authorizes the release of funds when requested by the USAID Administrator.</p>	

The U.S. also provides multilateral food security and nutrition assistance through U.N. agencies and global development banks. The U.S. is the largest shareholder of the [World Bank Group](#) (WBG), a multilateral development bank (MDB) that uses loans and grants to assist low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in pursuing sustainable development priorities in all sectors, with a concentration on infrastructure, human development, agriculture, and public administration. U.S. leadership in the WBG ensures that it can help shape the global development agenda, leveraging WBG investments to ensure effectiveness and on-the-ground impact.

Highlighted below are the Rome-based food security focused agencies of the U.N. and a World Bank affiliated food security focused multilateral financing platform that are supported by the USG.

The [International Fund for Agricultural Development](#) (IFAD) is a multilateral financing institution that supports programs in rural areas. All IFAD projects are country-led and country-owned, designed in consultation with smallholder farmers and other rural beneficiaries. IFAD is the “only specialized global development organization exclusively dedicated to transforming agriculture, rural economies, and food systems.” During IFAD’s replenishment process, the USG makes three-year funding commitments.


The [Global Agriculture and Food Security Program](#) (GAFSP) is a multilateral mechanism launched by the G20 in response to the 2007-2008 food price crisis. GAFSP aims to increase investment in food and nutrition security to build sustainable food systems and improve the livelihoods of small-scale farmers. GAFSP funds projects led by governments or farmer and producer organizations in close collaboration with international organizations, which provide financial and technical support and oversight of programs. Since 2010, GAFSP has pooled over [\\$2 billion](#) in donor funds.

The [World Food Programme](#) (WFP) is the world’s largest humanitarian organization. Two-thirds of WFP programming focuses on emergency food assistance in severe food crises. However, its programming also covers school meals, climate change resilience, cash assistance, and smallholder farmers.

The [Food and Agriculture Organization](#) (FAO) is a knowledge-focused organization. It conducts research, collects data, provides technical assistance, and runs educational programs to support agricultural development. Its core goals are to address food insecurity, improve nutrition, boost resilience, reduce rural poverty, and sustainably manage natural resources.

WHERE U.S. FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION PROGRAMS OVERLAP

This map highlights a snapshot of where key US food security and nutrition programs implementation overlaps. Programs featured include Feed the Future, Food for Peace Title II Emergency and non-Emergency, McGovern-Dole Food for Education, Nutrition, and Food for Progress. Data is from 2022.



For more detail on which programs were working where, go to [“Annex 2: Where US Food Security and Nutrition Programs Operate.”](#)

STRENGTHS AND CHALLENGES OF THE CURRENT U.S. SYSTEM

STRENGTHS

The United States has a unique ability and longstanding experience to drive change in global agrifood systems, to tackle food insecurity and malnutrition, and foster an end to global hunger. The depth and breadth of U.S. programming positions the United States to respond in times of global food crises and partner quickly and effectively with communities and governments worldwide to build stronger, more sustainable, and more resilient agrifood systems. The diversity of U.S. global food security programs and assistance tools also ensures that interventions and approaches can support or partner with communities in the manner required by a given context or challenge. The recent global response to the war in Ukraine shows that when food insecurity spikes, the U.S. leads the way and mobilizes international support for decisive action.

The wealth of agriculture expertise, both within the USG and in the U.S. private sector, is also a huge asset to global food security and nutrition programs. This expertise is strategically used to strengthen and expand the impact of programs. The U.S. university agriculture research community and American farmers also play critical roles in the global food security response. They are leaders in helping to drive research and support international communities with food assistance and innovation. USDA plays a key role in connecting American trade and agriculture industries to U.S. food assistance programs. USAID, in particular, has the expertise and ability to address global food insecurity through multisectoral approaches that integrate WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene), climate adaptation, nutrition, protection, and resilience programming. The DFC engages the American private sector to enhance investments in agriculture and other development sectors.

CHALLENGES

Concurrently, today's global food insecurity and malnutrition crisis is revealing deep shortcomings in how the U.S. responds to global food insecurity. The challenges listed below hinder the effectiveness and impact of programs, fuel uncertainty for the future of U.S. agricultural leadership, and make it more difficult for the U.S. global food security response structure to adapt to rapidly changing contexts and realities. These challenges, collectively, reduce the ability of the U.S. to contribute toward resilient agrifood systems that are better able to handle, recover from, and move past increasing and recurring.

► **Increased Politicization of U.S. Foreign Assistance**

U.S. foreign policy programs have increasingly been featured in partisan discussions, and proposals have been made to cut or eliminate programs. Political polarization hinders traditional bipartisan support for U.S. global food security and nutrition programs and limits the probability that substantive reforms move through Congress. Despite this trend, several successful bipartisan pieces of legislation have passed in recent years, including the Global Food Security Act (GFSA) and the Global Malnutrition Prevention and Treatment Act (GMPTA). Both were signed into law in 2022 with overwhelming bipartisan support. Discussions on strengthening global food and nutrition security programs through the next Farm Bill have also received bipartisan interest. However, recent legislative reform efforts lack the ambition and resources necessary to solve thorny political or systemic problems. Politicization can be further reinforced by challenges of jurisdiction and political allegiance across the Agriculture and Foreign Relations committees in Congress. Committees of jurisdiction should collaborate to strengthen the collective U.S. global food security response, but reform efforts often become more adversarial than collaborative.

► **Structural Overlaps of U.S. Global Food Security and Nutrition Programs**

The U.S. global food security response structure engages with and is implemented by a myriad of government agencies, primarily USAID and USDA. Within USAID, programs are further divided between the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, the Bureau for Resilience and Food Security, and the Global Health Bureau—each contributing unique expertise and experience. This scattered approach can lead to duplication and competition for resources and political support between agencies and bureaus. The Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS) works to set a whole-of-government strategy, common vision, and goals for programs to achieve collectively. Unfortunately, the GFSS has inconsistent buy-in across contributing agencies and does not give a strong roadmap for agencies on when or where to engage most effectively. The GFSS is seen by stakeholders, both inside and outside the government, primarily as a USAID-led food security strategy. As the programmatic leader of the GFSS, USAID is responsible for aligning

contributions from a dozen other agencies involved in the interagency development process, but it does not have the authority to adjudicate disputes successfully or push for implementation data. Coordination and collaboration on GFSS throughout the policy and program cycle are often de-incentivized when USG staff are overstretched and individual agency contributions are not made clear.

► **Stagnant Investment in Long-Term Development of Agrifood System**

There is currently an imbalance between the U.S. resources provided to humanitarian food assistance programs and those provided to long-term development programs. The majority of [U.S. international food assistance](#) is directed toward countries and regions that face cyclical and recurring food shortages and unprecedented rates of malnutrition. Although continued support for humanitarian food assistance and emergency response is essential, investing the vast majority of U.S. food security funding in emergency response and treatment instead of prevention and long-term systemic solutions will not change the current dynamics of food insecurity and malnutrition.

Evidence shows that substantial funding during the 2008 food crisis slowed down the immediate food and humanitarian needs of those affected, but failed to address long-term food security needs, contributing to the crisis today. Despite this research, Feed the Future—the USG’s flagship food security program focused on sustainable agriculture development, resilience, and nutrition—has been flat-funded for over a decade while the number of focus countries has increased. It is a false choice to think of immediate needs and long-term, preventative solutions as zero-sum. To break the cycle, the collective U.S. global food security response must further invest in long-term agriculture and resilience programs to fortify communities against future shocks and crises and bolster local agrifood systems while simultaneously responding to immediate humanitarian needs.

► **Entrenched Siloing of Foreign Assistance Funding Streams Contributes to Inadequate Transitions Between Programs**

The spectrum of challenges the U.S. global food security structure must address is broad, having to simultaneously respond to immediate humanitarian needs and scale up agrifood systems and value chains across the continuum of programs. This challenge is exemplified in the [Global Food Security Strategy](#) (GFSS), which simultaneously prioritizes the promotion of agriculture-led growth and support for vulnerable communities to sustainably reduce global hunger, malnutrition, and poverty. This programmatic tension across the GFSS stretches focus and resources, making effective layering and sequencing of global food security programs difficult.

Despite the growing global need for humanitarian and development support, foreign assistance programs remain [less than 1%](#) of the U.S. budget. Limited resources, programmatic earmarks, and current funding structures create a zero-sum game among programs even when their mandates and impacts are aligned. Due to these challenges, coordinated, multisectoral approaches that require expertise and resources from different funding streams—and local and national partners, which have a strategic force multiplier for building resilience—often suffer. This competition and inflexibility of resources threaten programmatic sustainability and impact.

Furthermore, USAID and USDA have limited leverage to advocate for changes in congressional funding directives and other administrative burdens. Outside stakeholders, including INGOs, often advocate for funding directives. Still, the sheer amount of funding directed to specific countries and specific programs through annual appropriations reduces flexibility and the ability to prioritize holistic, sustainable programming, particularly as conditions change on the ground. This leads to painful and ad hoc trade-offs between short-term programs that meet pressing, lifesaving needs and longer-term development programs that address underlying drivers.



► Barriers to Sustained Investment in Local Partners and Local Leadership

Successive Administrations have tried in various ways to push for greater degrees of partnership with local organizations to ensure better development and sustainability. Despite progress in advancing a coherent locally led approach across humanitarian and development policies, there are still significant challenges in operationalizing the locally led agenda. Much of this concerns donors' foreign policies and cultural, legal, and operational frameworks that hinder local and community-based organizations' ability to partner with and access direct USG resources. In 2021, USAID Administrator Samantha Power committed to ensuring that 25% of USAID assistance will go to local partners by the end of FY2025 and that 50% of programs will be led by local communities by the end of the decade. This initiative continues efforts to shift the USG approach and underscores a deeper understanding by the USG that local organizations are critical in sustaining development gains over time.

While this change is a huge step in the right direction and has bipartisan support, it is uncertain whether implementing this ambitious commitment is possible or if the policy has enough support to withstand administration changes in addition to political and Congressional scrutiny.

► Structural Limitations for Private Sector Investment

Agriculture is a vital global economic sector and a pathway out of poverty that employs approximately **500 million** smallholder farmers worldwide. Private sector investment in the agrifood system provides a critical opportunity to expand economic growth and reverse recent trends in food insecurity and malnutrition. Research shows growth in the agriculture sector is **at least twice** as effective in reducing poverty as growth in other sectors. Yet, agricultural development remains **largely underfinanced** globally, and the USG has limited tools to fuel investments. There is immense **space for further investment** and agriculture growth; private sector capital has the potential to fill the gaps. However, investment in global agriculture is seen as **inherently more risky** and less profitable than other investments. The perception of risk is driven by **production, yield, and supply chain risks** from climate-driven disasters, like droughts and floods; challenges in road and transportation infrastructure; and complexities in regulations and expertise. This can lead to agriculture and climate funding flowing mainly to higher-capacity firms without community connections.

Feed the Future and the DFC are the two primary tools of the USG to promote private sector investment in agriculture and food systems. Feed the Future's **private sector engagement** approach works alongside the private sector to design, create, and finance solutions that reduce poverty, fight hunger, and improve nutrition. The DFC invests in agriculture and food security production projects that help smallholder farmers access training and tools to increase yields, strengthen value chains, reduce food waste, build critical food processing infrastructure, and enable countries to expand food exports. Other private sector engagement tools include **USAID's Private Sector Collaboration Pathway**. These are strong and growing tools, but both Feed the Future and the DFC have limited reach, and there are financial and programmatic gaps in the options available to the USG to fuel private sector investment. The U.S. bureaucracy is also often incompatible with the speed and expected timelines for investment in agrifood systems and operations and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

Another challenge is that the USG and NGOs often use different terminology than the private sector, making communication and collaboration difficult. The absence of engagement with international and local private sector actors, particularly mid-size innovative growth firms, limits the agrifood system's impact, reach, and sustainability.

► Over Prioritization of American Agriculture and Shipping Interests

Several U.S. food assistance programs—including Food for Progress, Food for Peace Title II, and McGovern-Dole Food for Education—use U.S. agricultural commodities to supply “in-kind” food assistance, like wheat, corn, and rice, to fulfill their mandates. In many cases—particularly in emergencies—agricultural commodities are critical to ensuring communities have enough food and resources to survive acute food insecurity and malnutrition. In some contexts, however, importing U.S. commodities **jeopardizes local and regional markets** by reducing food prices, negatively impacting local production and trade, and failing to serve communities' needs. To break the cycle of hunger, food assistance programs must give communities the tools to improve local agricultural productivity and food storage, manage water, make nutritious food more accessible, and adapt to extreme weather events. These interventions can minimize the severity of the next disaster and reduce the need for expensive emergency interventions.

Research has shown in many contexts that market-based assistance is preferable because it can assist more people **faster and with more effective** and efficient use of funding while **supporting local markets and producers**, which builds long-term food security. Despite the research, **several groups** advocate for increased use of commodities and rollback updates to international food assistance programs set out in prior Farm Bills. When decisions about when and where to use commodities are mandated beyond

what communities need, it undermines program efficiency and can even cause harm to local producers and markets.

Posing further difficulties is the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-664) which limits efforts to efficiently and effectively deliver U.S. in-kind food. The law requires that 50% of all government cargo, including food procured in the U.S. for international aid programs, be shipped on U.S.-flagged vessels. **Proponents** argue the policy supports American jobs and contributes to military readiness by maintaining support for U.S.-flagged vessels. However, cargo preference requirements decrease the effectiveness and reach of food assistance programs. As a result of the requirement, USAID paid nearly 30% more per metric ton in FY2022 to ship commodities for Food for Peace Title II programs than it would have paid absent this requirement. Further, USAID estimates that if cargo preference had been waived in 2022, it would have saved \$41 million, translating to nearly 3.7 more people that could have been reached with critical food assistance.¹



VISION FOR AN IMPROVED U.S. GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY RESPONSE SYSTEM

There is not one silver bullet recommendation, or even a series of recommendations, for the USG that will solve global food insecurity and malnutrition. However, setting a clear, consistent, and actionable vision of how the U.S. can and should respond and then aligning programs and agencies to contribute to that common vision will create a food and nutrition response structure greater than the sum of its parts.

Ultimately, the U.S. must make agrifood system resilience the core of its programming. This means centering **resilience**—the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses—to reduce chronic vulnerability and facilitate inclusive growth.

Focusing on resilience will strengthen responders' ability to adapt to volatility and elevate outcomes as a priority. This focus will enable greater clarity of roles and responsibilities of relevant USG entities across food and nutrition programs and provide flexibility to make the right interventions at the right time. This approach to resilience inherently prioritizes holistic approaches that address the underlying causes of hunger and achieve outcomes across various sectors of foreign assistance. Any vision with resilience at its core must be developed, planned, and implemented with local and national partners in the lead, using evidence-based interventions to improve and reinforce strategic decision-making.

Making resilience the core of food security and nutrition programs will also bolster additional humanitarian and development goals, including but not limited to: sustained gains by centering local partners; effective preventative and anticipatory action; increased inter- and intra-agency coordination, collaboration and alignment; coherent approaches to international organizations and financial institutions; and improved private sector engagement.

¹ This estimate is a cleared internal statistic from USAID BHA's Office of Field and Response Operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO ACHIEVE THE VISION

To achieve such a vision, the USG must make many mutually reinforcing changes. These recommendations are designed to address the universe of challenges facing U.S. global food security and nutrition programs and provide ideas on how the collective USG response could be strengthened to better meet our community's vision. In the coming months, InterAction and its Members will dive deeper into recommendations to provide greater context and detail.

In all, we propose 17 recommendations across three areas of impact: Interagency Structures and Strategies, Funding and Programs, and Program Implementation and Planning.

INTERAGENCY STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIES

1. Achieve a whole-of-government approach under the Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS) focused on resilience, prevention, and anticipation to strengthen program coordination, collaboration, and alignment.

Currently, the [U.S. Government Global Food Security Strategy \(GFSS\) 2022-2026](#) sets a vision for coordination across the Feed the Future initiative to “sustainably reduce global poverty, hunger, and malnutrition across three interconnected objectives:

- ▶ Inclusive and sustainable agriculture-led economic growth.
- ▶ Strengthened resilience among people and systems.
- ▶ A well-nourished population, especially among women and children.

This is a strong vision, but the strategy does not effectively lay out the unique role or responsibilities of different global food security programs or account for collaboration challenges arising from competing and overlapping programmatic authorities and mandates of U.S. global food security and nutrition programs. When coordination and collaboration across programs and agencies are included in the GFSS, there is a lack of accountability and authority to ensure effective contributions to a common set of food security and nutrition outcomes. The GFSS relies on personalities and individual leaders for cooperation, undermining sustainable and systemic alignment across programs. This is particularly true for programs that bridge humanitarian and development assistance. The GFSS addresses the need for humanitarian-development-peace coherence, but humanitarian food assistance is not incorporated in the objectives or intermediate results.

Coordination is also just the beginning. Consistent collaboration between the White House and individual agencies on policy and strategy and among agencies on program planning and implementation is necessary to break down traditional silos across U.S. food security and nutrition programs and humanitarian and development approaches. Agencies and bureaus need clear roles and responsibilities to address the inherent challenges of so many actors—many of whom have their own strategies—working toward overlapping goals. The bulk of this work can and must be done at the agency-level, but sustained White House buy-in to the GFSS across administrations and leadership to ensure that each agency is accountable, will address duplication and competition among agencies. Any system of collaboration across bureaus and agencies must confront the realities of staffing and structures that disincentive work beyond existing job descriptions.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. USG agencies should fully adopt and contribute to the [Global Food Security Strategy](#) and its common vision across all U.S. global food security and nutrition programs. The GFSS should include how each program across different agencies and bureaus contributes to the strategy. It should also create accountability measures to support programs in reaching their goals.
2. The GFSS should better define individual agency roles and responsibilities in the global food security response system based on their unique value and area of expertise under the following broad framework. Additionally:
 - The White House National Security Council staff should support the interagency process, the Feed the Future Global Coordinator, and USAID as the lead agency for GFSS. It should further hold agencies accountable to the strategy and its reporting outcomes. This role is particularly important to prioritize and coordinate the issue across agencies and administrations.

- The Department of State should lead humanitarian and development diplomacy to address the drivers of conflict and climate change directly. State should empower the Special Envoy for Global Food Security to better leverage the tools of diplomatic influence to rally global action to end global hunger. The State Department—through USUN and Treasury, as applicable—should also drive engagement from partner countries and multilateral institutions to, for example, agree on accountability mechanisms through U.N. resolutions on conflict, such as [UNSCR 2417](#).
- USAID should continue and enhance its programmatic ownership of the GFSS as interagency coordination is improved. This includes better connections between development and humanitarian modalities and demanding multisectoral programming that goes beyond direct intervention and drives at the root causes of food insecurity and malnutrition to achieve more sustainable outcomes.
- USDA should continue to mobilize support from the U.S. agricultural community to end global hunger and malnutrition. In collaboration with other agencies, USDA should support the use of U.S. agricultural commodities for food assistance programs and provide technical expertise as appropriate in humanitarian and development contexts, particularly by utilizing tools available through programs like McGovern-Dole.
- Other USG agencies should continue providing additional support with their partners and counterparts to support the GFSS. For example, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) links assistance modalities and private sector investments, especially for smallholder farmers. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) can provide an equivalent compact partnership with national governments and the Department of Treasury with multilateral development banks and international financial institutions.

2. **Align relevant sector policies and strategies to ensure holistic and multisectoral approaches to global food security and nutrition program implementation.**

To reverse backsliding on hunger and malnutrition and better prepare for the anticipated intensity of future shocks, a holistic and multisectoral approach that works across agencies and interconnected sectors—including water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), climate, nutrition, gender, and health—is essential. Many of these interconnected sectors have active policies and strategies that guide programming and can highlight cross-sectoral policy connections. Over the last several years, the USG has updated the Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS), [U.S. Global Water Security Strategy 2022-2027](#), [U.S. Government Global Nutrition Coordination Plan 2021-2026](#), [USAID Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Strategy 2014-2025](#), [USAID Climate Strategy 2022-2030](#), [USAID Local Capacity Strengthening Policy](#), [2023 USAID Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Policy](#), the [Global Fragility Strategy](#), and [USAID Private Sector Engagement Policy](#). USAID is also revising its approach to resilience with the [2022 Resilience Policy Revision](#).

Even though the [2023 USAID Policy Framework](#) identifies investing in lasting food security as one of the greatest challenges of our time, and each of these policies and strategies are related to the collective global food security response, it is not clear how current strategies and policies are fully aligned. Each strategy can provide competing guidance on prioritization. Several program strategies highlighted also have overlapping target or priority countries and zones of influence, sometimes intentionally. Where overlap occurs, effective layering and sequencing of programs are critical in countries and communities. Guidance on how to best draw connections across strategies and programs must be incorporated into the strategies and policies themselves.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. Every four years, USAID and USDA should review and conduct evaluations of USG policies and strategies that govern the U.S. response to global food insecurity to ensure effectiveness, identify areas of alignment, and prevent duplication. Furthermore, USAID and USDA should publicly report on the ways in which food and nutrition interventions impact the entire food system, plus gender equality, disability inclusion, and those with protected characteristics.
2. The administration should ensure that related whole-of-government strategies and plans, such as the [Global Water Strategy 2022-2027](#) and [PREPARE Action Plan](#), increase the breadth and depth of coordination between implementing agencies and multilateral partners. This is particularly important when target or priority countries overlap.

3. Leverage research and data to better anticipate and act earlier in response to food and nutrition crises.

Scientists have effectively predicted food insecurity for many years through instruments like [FEWS NET](#). In recent years, the humanitarian sector has implemented [anticipatory](#) and [early actions](#) following warnings of impending hazards to reduce the impact of disasters on vulnerable people. While there is huge ambition within the humanitarian sector, and USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) recently released an [Early Recovery, Risk Reduction, and Resilience](#) (ER4) program, there is a lack of definitional clarity on how USAID understands and uses anticipatory or early actions as part of a holistic response. While USAID is currently piloting anticipatory action approaches, there is currently no stand-alone funding for anticipatory action, leaving uncertainty on how to support this work and competition for resources within other programs. Additionally, it is not clear which anticipatory action mechanisms are the most effective under specific circumstances. In December 2021, BHA launched the [Academic Alliance on Anticipatory Action](#) project to address gaps in knowledge about what is effective, but more needs to be done to scale anticipatory action.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. USAID should add definitions, examples, and information about anticipatory action into existing strategies and frameworks (i.e., the GFSS, [ER4 Framework](#), and USAID Resilience Policy Revision).
2. Congress should provide clear guidance on how existing funding like International Disaster Assistance or the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust can be better used to support anticipatory action.
3. USAID should expand on research from the Academic Alliance for Anticipatory Action and improve reporting around program outcomes, impacts, cost-effectiveness, and lessons learned around anticipatory action.
4. Where possible, USAID should prioritize collecting and using data from frontline organizations and strengthen their capacity for anticipatory action.
5. In contexts where food security actors have limited or no access to data, USAID should invest in scenario-based modeling to visualize longer time horizons. They should also build political will and agreement to use such models to support decision-making on anticipatory action. USAID should connect data and analysis from water security monitoring programs like NASA's SWOT (Surface Water and Ocean Topography) satellite into existing warning systems like FEWS NET.



4. Improve private sector engagement with the U.S. government and enhance support for local small and medium enterprises.

[USAID's Private Sector Engagement Policy](#) describes the private sector as an inextricable stakeholder in driving and sustaining outcomes capable of moving countries beyond the need for assistance and onto a pathway to self-reliance. The USG must utilize all available tools, programs, and agencies to support local small and medium enterprises (Smes), including engaging the private sector to scale up and encourage business models and supply chains that spur more sustainable and equitable food systems. Private sector investments must not only expand access to the global agrifood system but also not damage local livelihoods or contribute to further degradation of the environment. Support to local firms must include non-debt, non-financial resources such as management support and market links.

Despite the growing alignment of interests among the private sector, governments of developing countries, and donor agencies, the concentration and consolidation of key food and agriculture industries can undermine sustainability by prioritizing profits over consumers, small holder farmers, and the planet.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. Congress and the Administration should develop a more coherent approach for agriculture and related infrastructure adaptation and blended finance across DFC, USAID, USDA, etc. This will help promote accountable, agile platforms which get investments to the producer-level and non-financial support to early-stage local businesses working with smallholders. This approach should ensure high social and environmental safeguards. Agencies should focus on supporting local market-based social enterprises which prioritize food security for vulnerable farmers over profit and can sustainably scale their services through blended finance (earned revenue, concessional debt, and grants).
2. The Administration should prioritize initiatives that promote more private sector investment and innovation in climate-smart agriculture and food systems, like the [Agriculture Innovation Mission for Climate](#) (AIM4C), and further clarify how these initiatives will lead to improved outcomes for vulnerable smallholders.
3. USAID and other agencies should prioritize tools, resources, and approaches that support SMEs in building supply chain resilience to better prepare for and respond to recurring shocks.

5. Improve research and innovation to drive programming and adaptive learning.

Agriculture research and innovation are essential to understanding how to combat global food insecurity and malnutrition and break the cycle of hunger crises. It plays a significant and often underappreciated role in [driving economic growth and income](#). [USDA analysis](#) shows spending on public agriculture research from 1900 to 2011 generated, on average, \$20 in benefits to the U.S. economy for every \$1 spent. Yet, since 2002, USG investment in agriculture research and development has fallen by a third, and investments now lag behind other global leaders, including China, the world's largest funder for agriculture research and development.

The USG has the tools to invest in agriculture research and innovations effectively. Launched in 2022, the [Global Food Security Research Strategy](#) highlights the importance of public and private sector collaboration to advance agriculture research and development. The strategy focuses on leveraging U.S.-based institutions—like university-led [Feed the Future Innovation Labs](#)—international agricultural research centers—like [CGIAR](#)—and national government research and extension systems in target countries to reduce global hunger, poverty, and malnutrition. Feed the Future Innovation Labs draw on the expertise of top U.S. universities and developing country research institutions to tackle some of the world's greatest challenges in agriculture and food security and are a critical tool to ending global hunger.

The USDA is also leading several initiatives to enhance innovation and research in agriculture to improve the adaptation of agrifood systems to climate change. The [Agriculture Innovation Mission](#) (AIM) for Climate, a five-year (2021-2025) finance initiative, rallies global commitments across the public and private sectors to improve climate-smart agriculture and increase the ambition for public-sector funding. Additionally, [USDA's International Climate Hub](#) serves as a “platform to share research, tools, collaborative efforts, and best practices on a global scale to improve the world's ability to adapt to climate change and mitigate its impacts.”

Despite progress in data collection and analysis in food security and nutrition programming, a significant gap remains in the use and adoption of research and innovation to improve program implementation. Tackling this challenge is a priority of the GFSS and the [scaling up agenda](#) is designed to ensure proven technologies and practices are utilized at scale to help reduce global hunger and

poverty. [Agriculture extension services and information networks](#) can help improve smallholder farmers' access to research and innovations and increase the adoption of new technologies to strengthen agriculture resilience. Evidence-based program design and continually discovering and applying new data and knowledge can build smarter programs that achieve better results. The goal is to design and co-create more effective programs with all stakeholders, particularly smallholder farmers, that are better tailored to local contexts.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. USAID should enhance connections between Feed the Future Innovation Labs, local smallholder farmers, local universities and research institutions, NGOs, agriculture extension services, and private sector actors so innovations can be practically implemented and are responsive to local realities. These connections are particularly important to improve the adoption of innovations.
2. U.S. agencies should invest in data innovations, bridge implementation research and science gaps, and strengthen national data systems, including routinely available quality data on dietary diversity.
3. USAID should strengthen relationships with agrifood associations and increase cost-share to public land-grant universities and local research institutions to accelerate research and innovation.
4. U.S. agencies should incorporate and fund inception phases or dedicated periods of learning and adapting before implementation to co-create interventions with all stakeholders involved in implementing and funding programs, building upon the approach taken in BHA's Resilience Food Security Activities.
5. U.S. agencies should improve transparency, coordination, sharing, feedback mechanisms, and use of existing data by investing in a common data dashboard and emphasizing secondary data analysis.
6. USAID should strengthen national data systems; monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) processes; and mutual accountability systems beyond Feed the Future initiative efforts.
7. USAID should utilize existing research tools and advisory groups like [FEWSNET](#) and the [Board for International Food and Agricultural Development](#) (BIFAD) to develop policies and strategies, and support programs.

6. Continue to leverage the relationship with the World Food Programme and other U.N. response agencies to enhance accountability and sustainability of program impact.

As the largest donor to U.N. response agencies, particularly the World Food Programme (WFP), the U.S. plays a significant role in U.N. food assistance programs, operations, and accountability. In recent years, to address key bureaucratic barriers that delay implementation and service delivery to people in need, NGOs have collaborated directly with the WFP and met with USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) to outline the general state of WFP-NGO partnerships, raise issues and actions taken by the NGO community to address them, and request support from BHA in addressing concerns. Key concerns raised included challenges of cost coverage, standardization across WFP Country Offices, and delays in the signature of field-level project agreements between the WFP and NGOs. However, more work needs to be done to assure responsiveness and accountability from all U.N. agencies. It remains to be seen if the scale provided by U.N. response agencies directly translates into the best value for the U.S. as a donor.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. USAID should continue and expand its existing practice of NGO consultations by setting regular semi-annual check-ins with the NGO community before large donor-WFP meetings. This allows NGOs to share high-level issues of concern that BHA can then raise with WFP.
2. State and USAID should put more mechanisms in place to support the transparency of funds provided to U.N. response agencies, starting with WFP. This should include accountability mechanisms to track the ability of WFP to increase food security through outcome and output level indicator tracking of food security metrics and require a separate analysis and report on how WFP carries out beneficiary targeting at country levels.

3. BHA should encourage U.N. response agencies to establish evidence-based methods of evaluating the state of NGO partnerships, starting with WFP. Methods could include an annual partnership survey to determine areas for improvement, measure progress, and inform future partnership initiatives and policy changes.
4. State and USAID should conduct a value-chain analysis of U.N. response agencies, starting with WFP, to assess the trade-off between the scale provided by WFP and potential efficiencies and advancements of USG objectives by more directly funding civil society implementers, particularly local organizations.

7. Expand USG involvement and call for meaningful reforms at the World Bank and other multilateral development institutions. Reforms include expanding beyond their traditional development financing practices into cross-cutting global issues like food systems security, nutrition, and climate change.

The original mission of the World Bank was to restore the global economy in a post-World War II scenario. Since then, its mission has slowly evolved, adjusting to changing times and responding to the demands of shareholders. Since approximately 2013, the three priorities that rule the World Bank’s mission to end poverty and boost prosperity for the poorest people are:

- ▶ Help create sustainable economic growth.
- ▶ Invest in people.
- ▶ Build resilience to shocks and threats that can roll back decades of progress.

Even though the World Bank already assists in providing some financing for global public goods (like climate and environment), multiple overlapping crises—affecting developing and developed countries alike—have brought the human cost of underinvestment to light. Thus, the current call for multilateral development lending institutions reforms, including the World Bank, is an opportunity to integrate and unlock more robust and cross-sectoral funding downstream in volatile and fragile contexts. This will help support pandemic recovery, address food insecurity, and mitigate and adapt to climate change. As the largest shareholder of the World Bank Group, the U.S. has a vital role to play in shaping the institution’s reform. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has already called for the Bank to better address climate change, global health, and fragility. Further investments in these areas could have an impact on global agrifood systems and food security.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. The USG should continue engaging in conversations pushing for meaningful reforms that prioritize financing for global health, climate (mitigation, adaptation, and biodiversity), agriculture, and fragility. These reforms should include:
 - Issuance of new special drawing rights (SDRs) to increase fiscal capacity, as well as new ways to allocate or reallocate SDRs.
 - Inclusion of debt suspension clauses in International Financial Institutions (IFIs) future lending to let nations temporarily pause their debt repayments for a pre-agreed period when a predefined event hits (e.g., violent storms, flooding, pandemic) so they can use that money to respond to and better withstand disasters.
2. The USG should recommend that the World Bank also further integrate financial support for these priorities (global health, climate, agriculture, and fragility) within its current country-driven model.

FUNDING AND PROGRAMS

1. **Prioritize interventions that build resilience and promote appropriate sequencing, layering, and integration across humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding assistance.**

Resilient agrifood systems support durable and sustainable human well-being, increase community capacity to respond to shocks, improve the long-term effectiveness of aid, and prevent backsliding of development gains, thereby reducing future humanitarian costs. Instead of viewing humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding (HDP) programs as separate modalities, these programs and mechanisms should be seen as interconnected tools in the broader USG food security and nutrition toolbox and build on the vision set out in the [USAID Policy Framework](#).

Resilience must be incorporated into all HDP programs. USG humanitarian partners should consider resilience from the beginning of interventions and incorporate research, models, and best practices for sequencing, layering, and integrating food assistance and other sectoral responses. BHA's [early recovery, risk reduction, and resilience](#) (ER4) programs provide a key opportunity for this work. For agriculture development-focused programs, long-term resilience interventions must consider how to better intervene and scale-up programs in the most fragile contexts and adapt to the realities of the changing climate. This will require increased focus and investment in innovative development programs, like [PREPARE](#) and the [Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils](#) (VACS), which work across agencies to integrate climate adaptation into programs better, enhance research, and scale resilient, climate-smart crops, techniques, and technologies.

USAID's BHA and Bureau for Resilience and Food Security (RFS) both implement resilience programming, with the [Center for Resilience](#) bringing together expertise from across bureaus. In December 2022, USAID released the draft [2022 Resilience Policy Revision](#) to update agency guidance on how to engrain resilience across sectors and programs. The updated draft policy takes necessary steps to strengthen resilience programming, expand it across sectors, and fill gaps that have emerged since the original 2012 policy. It also makes progress by uplifting local ownership as a core principle of resilience and promoting HDP coherence throughout. While not finalized as of publication, this policy is a critical step to effectively center resilience in the U.S. global food security response and provide guidance on improving the layering and sequencing for programs.

As the USG further integrates resilience into programs throughout the interagency, it must go beyond existing guidance and research to better prioritize local ownership and leadership and address challenges of farmer adoption of practices at scale. Such an approach will ensure that USG agencies have enough flexibility to make the right interventions at the right time, ensuring that individual programs and interventions can be deployed before food insecurity and malnutrition reach crisis levels.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. USAID should move beyond guidance for sequencing, layering, and integrating programs across HDP programs and invest in innovative pilot programs funded and managed across bureaus, including identifying a specific lead bureau for individual programs. This will support long-term resilience, help better identify the unique strengths of each bureau, and help address gaps between bureaus.
2. USG programs should redouble efforts on cross-cutting priorities like local ownership, equity- and rights-based approaches, risk analysis, anticipatory or early action, and flexible funding. In addition to their other functions, the stated priorities will improve food system resilience.
3. USG programs should invest in building adaptive and inclusive social protection systems that can scale up during emergencies.
4. Congress should authorize the President's Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE), which supports communities in vulnerable situations around the world to adapt and build resilience to the impacts of climate change. A sustained focus on climate adaptation and resilience across administrations is critical to combat climate change's impact on the global agrifood system.
5. USG should invest in climate-smart crops and technologies through initiatives like PREPARE, Feed the Future, and Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS), ensuring there are clear plans to encourage, facilitate, and sustain the adoption of these practices at scale among the most vulnerable smallholders.

6. USAID should fully operationalize the [2022 Resilience Policy Revision](#)—this policy is currently being finalized and the recommendation is based on draft language. Other U.S. agencies should also develop resilience policies to strengthen implementation and engrain a whole-of-government approach.
7. Double down on high-impact, cost-effective nutrition interventions to accelerate progress in maternal newborn and child health. Integrate the World Health Organization’s [Essential Nutrition Actions](#) into antenatal and postnatal care delivery platforms. E.g., nutritional interventions, such as multiple micronutrient supplements (MMS), balanced energy and protein (BEP) dietary supplementation, and calcium supplementation.
8. USG programs should strengthen sustainable nutrition programming, health service quality, and health systems delivery by investing in training community health workers in nutrition counseling skills, breastfeeding support, and appropriate infant and young child feeding practices. Programs should also increase the availability and promotion of supplements like MMS and Vitamin A.

2. Increase investments in systemic, long-term global food security and nutrition funding to build resilience and better respond to cyclical food insecurity and malnutrition.

Addressing the disparity between crisis response and longer-term funding is essential in making resilience the core of U.S. food security and nutrition programming. Humanitarian resources can be shaped and coordinated in a way that better lays the groundwork for resilience building, diversifying nutrition, and food system improvements. With increased investment, development actors may be better positioned to find opportunities to undertake longer-term activities in otherwise fragile and insecure contexts.

The U.S. funds preventative and sustainable food security approaches through both traditional humanitarian and development programs, like Food for Peace Title II, McGovern-Dole Food for Education, and Feed the Future. Investments in these interventions are [proven to work](#). In addition, investing in cost-effective nutrition interventions to prevent additional cases of severe malnutrition and treat children on the verge of starvation could save hundreds of thousands of lives in the years to come. Despite the small number of resources—amounting to 1.5% of Global Health funding in FY2023—nutrition-specific interventions are [relatively inexpensive to implement](#) and have an extremely high return on investment— [every \\$1 invested results in \\$35 in economic returns](#). Additionally, every dollar invested in resilience-building programs [saves \\$3](#) in humanitarian assistance when crisis strikes. These significant returns on investment should continue to be prioritized while maintaining funding to meet existing humanitarian needs. Increased funding in long-term agriculture, resilience, and nutrition accounts can free up humanitarian resources to focus on the immediate needs of communities most vulnerable to famine.

Sustained U.S. investment in [climate adaptation](#) is also critical to support agrifood system adaptations and resilience building against the effects of climate change. Consistent investment in climate adaptation and resilience helps communities withstand cyclical shocks that impact food insecurity and can reduce climate-related impacts on critical infrastructure, agricultural productivity, water resources, and public health. Another opportunity for investment in climate solutions for small holder farmers is with [IFAD’s Enhanced Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme](#) (ASAP+), which aims to be the largest fund dedicated to supporting climate finance to small-scale producers.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. Congress should increase funding for Feed the Future and build toward a goal of \$2 billion annually to better balance development and humanitarian funding streams and strengthen proven U.S. investment in food systems, agriculture development, climate-smart agriculture and resilience, nutrition, and multisectoral approaches that tackle global hunger and malnutrition.
2. Congress should provide robust base funding for global food security programs, like McGovern Dole Food for Education, provide consistent contributions to multilateral institutions, and fully invest in nutrition solutions within global health to meet the growing need for programming that comprehensively prevents and treats malnutrition.
3. Congress should fund Food for Peace, International Disaster Assistance, and other humanitarian appropriations accounts at a scale commensurate to global needs. This includes protecting funding for nonemergency RFSA programs, called the “safe box.”
4. Congress should increase funding for bilateral adaptation to support country-specific responses to adapt to and build resilience against the effects of climate change, including climate-smart agricultural solutions.

3. Enhance consistent collaboration across the USG and between USAID Bureaus to promote a unified programmatic approach to address the root causes of global hunger and malnutrition and track the impact of multisectoral integration.

To communicate across bureaus, USAID has created several leadership councils on nutrition, resilience, and WASH to leverage expertise and resources and ensure better aligned humanitarian and development efforts. These bodies create consistent avenues for cross-bureau collaboration and planning and forge critical working relationships across leadership and staff. This model is an effective platform for improving coordination and elevating collective leadership on key issues across USAID. The Global Malnutrition Prevention and Treatment Act (GMPTA), adopted in 2022, [codifies the Nutrition Leadership Council](#) at USAID to coordinate efforts to prevent and treat malnutrition globally.

However, more staff time, knowledge, resources, and capacity are necessary for programs to coordinate and collaborate effectively. Much of the existing coordination across programs is being driven by personalities and individual leadership within agencies and bureaus.

Furthermore, important functions are housed outside of USAID, including USDA FAS programming, DFC investments, and the State Department, which owns key aspects of prevention frameworks under the Global Fragility Strategy. To institutionalize existing coordination efforts, it is imperative to deliberately incorporate opportunities for cross-program training and engagement and provide staff with adequate time and resources.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. U.S. agencies should continue and expand coordination mechanisms like USAID Leadership Councils to institutionalize collaboration across USAID bureaus on nutrition, resilience, and WASH at leadership and working levels. When appropriate, Leadership Councils should coordinate across agencies to enhance connections between food security and nutrition programs implemented by different agencies; this will be particularly important for USAID and USDA FAS.
2. U.S. agencies should track and publicly report the impact of funding streams to demonstrate better how food security programs contribute to advancing nutrition, climate, WASH, resilience, and peacebuilding priorities. This should include distinctions between the impact of sensitive and specific funding.
3. The Chief Nutritionist position within USAID could be placed in the front office of USAID as a core leadership position instead of within a specific bureau. This position is pivotal in the Nutrition Leadership Council and represents intra- and inter-agency work to ensure effective efforts, coordination, and prioritization of nutrition issues.
4. U.S. agencies should provide further training for staff on mainstreaming of multisectoral programming and cross-sectoral impacts and drivers of food insecurity to enhance capacity and expertise to implement connections across programs effectively.
5. USAID should continue to accelerate hiring to fully support programs and ensure that staff have the capacity to implement and evaluate global food security programs effectively. In addition, collaboration incentives should be built into performance management structures.

4. Diversify funding mechanisms so they are fit for purpose and flexible enough to meet changing needs as they arise.

Many of the mechanisms used to fund global food security and nutrition efforts are not fit for purpose or flexible enough to meet rapidly changing needs on the ground. Although USAID is making meaningful strides in utilizing the GFSS to develop longer-term strategies and has made crisis modifiers available in many contexts, gaps remain in how the U.S. government plans and uses the full suite of congressionally appropriated food security and nutrition funding. There are actions that the USG can take to diversify and increase funding flexibility right now.

While it is essential to fund programs targeted at specific sectors, current means of funding limit the ability of implementing partners to be flexible to changing needs and move away from siloed programming to tackle larger development and humanitarian objectives across sectors, particularly Congressional funding directives that are disconnected from the changing conditions faced by USAID and its missions. Clearer processes are needed to access crisis modifiers, address protracted humanitarian crises, and implement programs across various sectors.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. USAID should develop and share a clear process for the use of crisis modifiers that is communicated across Agreement Officer's Representatives and missions so that existing USG partners understand when they may be used, when and how they may be requested, and when and how they will be received by implementing partners.
2. Congress should provide USAID greater flexibility to conduct multi-year planning and budgeting pilots—building upon existing three-year nexus awards, in select protracted crises that are experiencing recurring food security shocks—to better understand the benefits, impacts, and limitations of such an approach. Specific emphasis should be placed on ensuring that national and community-based organizations can participate in a pilot and resilience activities are emphasized throughout multi-year awards.
3. USAID, at both the headquarters and mission level, should identify greater opportunities, and work with Congress, to more effectively combine funding across appropriations accounts and congressional funding directives to holistically address the intersection of food security, nutrition, and agriculture with other sectors of humanitarian and development work in complex and rapidly changing contexts.

5. Increase research and transparency on program inputs and outcomes to include sharing of best practices, effective program examples, and lessons learned across the departments and agencies involved in the USG food security and nutrition space and related programming.

There is a lack of transparency around the impact of programs and where to find results across the several federal agencies that implement food security. The Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS) outlines a common approach for transparency, accountability, and learning that includes a shared Results Framework, performance monitoring process, standard performance indicators, evaluation approach, and learning framework. Yet, public data is irregularly released, and it is difficult to attribute the impact to individual programs. Gaps in data and transparency are particularly apparent regarding hunger's impact on women and girls. A [2022 analysis of global hunger strategies](#) showed that 26% of policies overlook women entirely and 47% do not mention gender inequality. While recent changes are a step in the right direction, [more can be done](#) to improve how all data is gathered, coordinated, shared, and used.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. The Global Food Security Strategy progress results and impact data should be publicly available and regularly updated with clear timelines and sourcing.
2. USAID should consolidate and streamline reporting and outcome indicators for nutrition and climate-sensitive programs that have interventions integrated into other sectors to better determine the most effective and impactful interventions and those that have the potential to reach true scale (i.e., sustainably reach millions of people across diverse geographies).
3. U.S. agencies should increase research and information sharing, particular areas of interest include sustainable traditional agricultural practices, incorporating the expertise of indigenous farmers, especially women and climate adaptation.

4. U.S. agencies should provide appropriate funding for further staff, training, data management systems, analysis, and documentation of impact.
5. All USG food security analysis and response plans should consider the particular challenges that women and girls face. U.S. agencies should require collection of sex- and age- disaggregated data and document how disparities affect programming.

6. Ensure that more funding makes it to frontline and local implementers as efficiently as possible by streamlining administrative burdens and reducing the use of funding intermediaries.

Several systemic programmatic and bureaucratic barriers are currently in place that inhibit direct USG partnerships with local partners and decrease funding efficiency. While the United States rightfully expects its implementing partners to maintain high standards in program delivery, it has different and less rigorous reporting requirements for its U.N. partners as opposed to INGO and local partners. Additionally, administrative and due diligence requirements across various donors lead to inefficiencies, particularly regarding staff time and resources.

These issues tip the balance of USG partners toward larger multilateral organizations and INGOs that can maintain international headquarters staff to track, manage, and comply with donor requirements, particularly in higher-risk crisis response settings. This sometimes leaves these larger partners as pass-through funders for frontline implementers, often local organizations—despite USAID’s commitment to 25% of funding going directly to local and national implementers. While multilateral organizations and INGOs do directly implement programming themselves and pass-through arrangements have important roles in development and assistance, this approach increases expenses through added associated administrative costs and overheads, reducing the overall funding for people in need.

Specific to food security, the recent merger of the Offices of Food for Peace and Foreign Disaster Assistance missed a key opportunity to streamline requirements, instead **imposing additional requirements** on implementers. USAID should continue to build on its “**Work With USAID**” **effort** and continue to build upon **locally led program efforts** to de-mystify the partnership process and make it more accessible. Further Recommendations Include:

1. To the extent practicable in food and nutrition programming, the U.S. should create simplified application and reporting requirements with standard indicators and terminology, further identifying where such requirements are applicable to specific programs and projects to reduce duplicative and unnecessary reporting across agencies and bureaus.
 - Due to the complexity of such an undertaking across many programs and agencies, USAID should implement a pilot of such reporting to help identify and develop solutions for related technical, programmatic, and financial issues before a wider rollout of such requirements. This process should be highly consultative, emphasizing the involvement of local and national organizations and organizations who have unsuccessfully applied for funding in the past to determine and address specific, wide-reaching barriers to successful partnerships.
 - Any successes in such an effort should be communicated to multilateral agencies and other institutional donors to sensitize better practices and harmonized reporting across donors.
2. USAID should reexamine its Emergency Application Guidelines and implement the recommendations outlined in the **Consolidated NGO Feedback on the Emergency Application Guidelines** to simplify and increase efficiencies in emergency applications for both USAID and NGOs.
3. To fully and fairly fund national and community-led organizations to meet donor requirements, USG agencies should, where appropriate, implement the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) **Guidance on the Provision of Overheads to Local and National Partners**.
4. USG agencies and bureaus should review how food security, nutrition, and humanitarian funding could move down the partnership “value chain,” identifying where more assistance could go directly to local implementers.
5. USAID should commit to supporting intermediaries to be better partners to local and national organizations by encouraging applications that include capacity-strengthening components in alignment with the **Local Capacity Strengthening Policy**, with full and fair funding for commensurate budget lines.

7. Allow food assistance programs to operate most efficiently by altering programmatic requirements.

As highlighted in the challenges above, there are several inefficiencies in U.S. food assistance programs driven by inflexible requirements for U.S. agricultural commodities or U.S. flagged vessels. These requirements impact the effectiveness of food aid programs. As previously explained, high shipping costs and long transportation times due to the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-664) mean fewer commodities and less food can reach those in need. For other programs, the impact of requirements is more nuanced. Food for Peace Title II authorizes non-emergency programs, called Resilience Food Security Activities (RFSAs), to reduce poverty, malnutrition, and food insecurity through tools such as water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions; agriculture and alternative livelihoods training; maternal child health and nutrition best practices; and good governance. Currently, restrictions and requirements within the Food for Peace Act limit the ability of implementers to build resilience via these multisectoral programs.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. Congress should waive or eliminate cargo preference requirements for all U.S. in-kind commodities in international food assistance programs.
2. Congress should make optional the U.S. commodity requirements for Food for Peace Title II non-emergency programs or Resilience Food Security Activities (RFSAs) to ensure programs can use the right tool for each unique context.



PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND PLANNING

1. Partner responsibly and equitably with local organizations to identify food and nutrition needs and ensure local priorities are centered.

Robust and resilient food security systems are not possible without putting communities and local partners in the lead. But current systems for procurement and delivery of aid and development programming favor international partners. This paradox is well known, and across the last several administrations, USAID has looked to better support and strengthen the capacity of local organizations to enhance the effectiveness and impact of programs by building community “self-reliance.”

As part of [USAID Forward](#), the Obama Administration looked to build stronger local partners through direct engagement. Under the [Journey to Self-Reliance](#), the Trump Administration looked to reorient strategies, partnership models, and program practices to better support partner countries to lead in their development.

The recent [USAID localization vision and approach](#) provides a renewed commitment to locally-led action for sustainable solutions. To catalyze a broader global shift to locally led development, the approach works across four lines of effort to adapt policy and program practices, shift power to local actors, channel a larger portion of assistance directly to credible local partners, and serve as a public advocate and thought leader.

[USAID’s Local Capacity Strengthening Policy](#) furthers this commitment by committing USAID to a unified, cohesive, and systemic approach to collaborating with local partners. The policy outlines an approach for USAID to more effectively and equitably partner with countries to:

- ▶ Define their own vision for success.
- ▶ Strengthen their ability to be effective and relevant actors within their communities and contexts.
- ▶ Elevate local ownership in sustaining development results

Structural and bureaucratic barriers could hinder the implementation of USAID’s approach. Still, a recent agency [Localization Progress Report](#) is a good signal of transparency and commitment to accountability. Other agencies should similarly track progress, outlining how their work and programs strengthen the capacity of local communities and build toward sustainable transitions of programs. The commitment to locally led development and humanitarian response must be sustained across administrations to see full results.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. U.S. agencies should institutionalize the inclusion and participation of local NGO consortia and other civil society voices in larger USG policy, planning, monitoring, and evaluation of food and nutrition security programs.
2. USDA should bolster the effectiveness of McGovern-Dole’s local and regional procurement (LRP) component by including more capacity strengthening work with local farmers, markets, and value chains.
3. USAID should increase the accessibility of USG programming opportunities to local partners, including through advertising in local outlets and languages and streamlining procurement requirements.
4. USAID should pursue its commitment to localization in food and nutrition related programs by:
 - Utilizing [USAID’s Locally Led Development Spectrum and Checklist](#) throughout the program cycle ensures local actors and priorities remain central at all stages
 - Designing and implementing programs to strengthen community-led food systems.
 - Actively practicing the principles for effective and equitable approaches to local capacity strengthening outlined in the Local Capacity Strengthening Policy.

2. Leverage existing coordination at the mission-level to further plan and account for local capacities, potential shocks, and other vulnerabilities. Systematize country-level partnership mechanisms, coordination practices, and financing tools that can support early action.

Given the successes of mission-level coordination, there is potential to house more coordination functions at the mission level, specifically using the Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) process, alternate partnership and procurement mechanisms, and local partner compacts modeled upon successful Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) compacts. The United States can also draw examples from the World Bank under the [Famine Action Mechanism](#) and institutionalize country-owned planning and preparation to include roles and responsibilities.

The missions should work more closely across humanitarian and development streams to better prepare for and execute forecasting, partner identifications, risk analyses, contingency planning, and transition facilitation from relief to development. This can be used to empower local partners—as demonstrated by DRR compacts—and more directly address the drivers of food insecurity, such as climate change or conflict.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. USAID's CDCSs should identify and plan around the following factors, where applicable:
 - Local actors, who may be best positioned to respond to natural disasters or other sudden onset emergencies.
 - Acute vulnerabilities that give rise to food insecurity and other humanitarian needs, including possible contingency and anticipatory actions.
 - Annual risk assessments at the country and regional level—including humanitarian risk assessments, early warning analyses, and forecasts of potential need—to ensure that the CDCS has not omitted the impact of events that have arisen since they were developed.
 - Additional response planning requirements in countries with forecasted acute food needs, including with the host government, NGOs, and other donors.
2. CDCSs should be revised on a shorter timeframe in countries affected by protracted crises, particularly long-term food insecurity, recognizing the need to adapt to dynamic contexts.
3. USAID should establish alternative partnership methodologies and procurement solutions to better respond to unanticipated, rapid-onset emergencies. Consider pre-identifying and establishing Memoranda of Understanding in conjunction with BHA, NGOs, and local partners who are best positioned to respond quickly. Examine procurement mechanisms to ensure rapid resource mobilization.
4. U.S. agencies should enhance strategies and capacities for mission-level coordination and collaboration across programs, particularly in countries where multiple USG global food security-related programs are operating.
5. USAID should facilitate resilience compacts with local partners, modeled after DRR compacts, as a mechanism to encourage information sharing and coordination across various USG programs in-country.

3. Better utilize systems approaches to strengthen national and local markets, climate adaptation, and disaster risk reduction.

One of the most effective investments the United States can make against cyclical shocks that drive food insecurity is system-level approaches, including market-based agrifood systems, climate adaptation, and disaster risk reduction (DRR). In addition to using research and analysis to stem risks before they become crises, these three approaches are demonstrated tools to empower local partners, address climate change, build more durable environments, and manage lagging income generation.

Further Recommendations Include:

1. USAID should further ingrain systems-level thinking as a pillar of Food for Peace Resilience Food Security Activities (RFS) and, where appropriate, other BHA humanitarian programming.
2. USAID should continue and expand DRR compacts with disaster-prone country governments or collections of community-led organizations. Compacts would be centered on mutual accountability, including predictable funding, in exchange for clear and completed steps toward strengthening national systems and the ability of local actors to respond in times of natural disaster.
3. RFS should identify further opportunities to downstream its market systems work toward including DRR and climate adaptation activities in food security programs, particularly those aimed at strengthening national systems.



AREAS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

During Big Think discussions, several topics were not fully explored but are highly relevant for understanding and improving the U.S. global food security and nutrition response.

U.S. Engagement with Multilateral Institutions.

The United States has been a historic leader in creating and using multilateral institutions to advance American development priorities worldwide and has played a major role in organizing much of the current multilateral development system. The World Bank, regional multilateral development banks, and the U.N. and its component agencies are essential in advancing the [Sustainable Development Goals](#) (SDGs), including Goal 2 of zero hunger. Since April 2022, as part of a comprehensive, global response to the food security crisis, the [World Bank has committed \\$30 billion](#) in financing to scale up short- and long-term food and nutrition security responses.

Given the scope of this paper, U.S. engagement with and within multilateral institutions was not fully investigated. The USG's contributions to and leadership of multilateral institutions, the impact of investments, and alignment with USG priorities and goals is a strong area for further examination. Additionally, the U.S. has significant political and policy influence that can be leveraged in multilateral efforts to combat conflict-induced hunger, human rights violations that lead to starvation, and the [High-Level Task Force on Preventing Famine](#), among many others. The USG also engages in the G7 and G22, which make efforts to address food security issues.

The Role of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).

The [MCC](#) is an independent U.S. foreign assistance agency created in 2004 by Congress with bipartisan support. MCC forms partnerships with developing countries that are committed to good governance, economic freedom, and investing in their citizens. It provides time-limited grants to promote economic growth, reduce poverty, and strengthen institutions. Grants are also provided for projects in areas relevant to food security and nutrition, including agriculture, land rights and access, and water supply and sanitation. MCC grants are designed to complement other U.S. and international development programs, but it is not clear how these projects advance long-term global food security and nutrition goals within the current structure.

Corporate Concentration and Power in the Global Food System.

Many agrifood sectors are now controlled by [four dominant firms](#), enabling these companies to wield enormous influence over markets, technology and innovation agendas, and policy and governance frameworks. The concern is that firms within concentrated markets are more incentivized to advance their shareholders' short-term interests, which risks undermining small-scale producers, raising prices, limiting product choices, and damaging the environment. Measures are needed to ensure that corporate concentration and power do not undermine key goals for food systems, such as equitable livelihoods and sustainable and inclusive food system governance.

U.S. Engagement with Humanitarian System Reform.

The United States is a signatory of the [Grand Bargain](#), a unique platform in the humanitarian sector that brings together humanitarian stakeholders, including donors, the U.N. and its agencies, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, INGOs, and NNGOs. The Grand Bargain explores ways to better serve people needing humanitarian assistance and offers a critical space for shared dialogue on common challenges that inhibit efficiency across the humanitarian system. While the Grand Bargain helped inform our recommendations, it is vitally important for the USG—as the largest humanitarian donor in the world—to meaningfully live up to it as their own priority. These efforts will only complement reforms in other areas.

Non-Tariff Barriers to Agricultural Trade.

World Trade Organization rules allow governments to adopt [non-tariff barriers](#) to agricultural trade when they are “necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health or are needed to ensure product quality and prevent deceptive practices.” These barriers include sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures like regulations to prevent the spread of pests, diseases, or disease-carrying and causing organisms; stop additives, toxins, or contaminants in food, beverages, or feedstuffs; health and quality standards; testing, registration, and certification requirements; and packaging and labeling regulations. Some American food and agricultural producers assert that several countries apply these regulations and standards in ways not supported by science, creating nontariff barriers to U.S. exports. The USG [seeks to eliminate](#) or reduce non-tariff barriers that decrease opportunities for U.S. exports or provide a competitive advantage to products of trade competitors. One growing area of contention is non-GMO policies. Several countries that receive U.S. food assistance [have non-GMO policies](#). Workarounds often need to be negotiated with governments to effectively support programs with U.S. commodities, causing delays or added administration.

WHAT WAS THE BIG THINK PROCESS?



The Big Think aimed to identify and understand key gaps in the U.S. response to global food insecurity and malnutrition and develop policy solutions for better USG preparation, prevention, response, and mitigation of cyclical and increasing food security shocks. To fulfill this goal, the Big Think engaged NGOs working to advance food security and nutrition across the development and humanitarian space. Four Task Team Discussion Groups were created, and a Learning Series was conducted, creating a space where NGOs could learn from one another and develop a collective advocacy approach.

- ▶ **Task Team Discussions:** The four Task Teams Discussion Groups, led by co-facilitators from InterAction staff and Members, focused on the topics of (1) policy coordination and structures; (2) layering and sequencing of programs; (3) climate as a driver and contributor to food insecurity; and (4) early action and prevention. From November 2022 to March 2023, each Task Team held between four and six meetings where NGO participants were invited to discuss the current system, including what is going well, current challenges, and how to improve it. Some of these meetings had external speakers from USAID, USDA, the World Bank, and academia to fill in knowledge gaps in the NGO community. After concluding discussions, the Task Team co-facilitators, with input from participants, filled out templates to consolidate recommendations identified around key common themes brought up throughout discussions.
- ▶ **Learning Sessions:** The Learning Series brought NGOs together to discuss the challenges of the current system; how international NGOs, national NGOs, and community-based organizations are tackling food insecurity; and how to improve U.S. policies and programs from an implementation perspective. Starting with the Big Think Workshop in November 2022 that kicked off the workstream, the topics explored were “Learning from existing NGO practices and advocacy,” “Responding to the global food security crisis in Africa,” “Zeroing in on Local Leadership,” “Conflict-Induced Hunger,” and “The Impact of Gender Inequality on Food Insecurity.”

Through the Task Team Discussions and Learning Series, InterAction engaged 68 organizations. Sixty-five NGO staff participants attended the Task Team Discussions, and 168 attended the Learning Sessions. The Learning Sessions had presenters from 18 organizations.

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The Big Think would not have been possible without the time, expertise, and guidance of staff, InterAction Members, and stakeholders across the InterAction community. Thank you.

Dozens of people organized and participated in learning events, offered feedback and advice, and ensured that this document was factual as this topic touches upon such a breadth of workstreams. These include NGO partners inside and outside of InterAction’s membership; current and former USAID, State, DFC, and congressional staff; partners representing international organizations and international financial institutions; private sector partners; and other subject matter experts and researchers whose work we relied upon.

This effort would have never been successful without the regular consultation of The Big Think Task Team co-facilitators: Barrett Alexander, Mercy Corps; Tom Buttry, InterAction; Michael Brown, World Vision; Michelle Brown, Action Against Hunger; Daren Caughron, Bread for the World; Hannah Chargin, World Vision; Sarah Fuhrman, InterAction; Jared Markland, Islamic Relief; Jenny Marron, InterAction; Marco Menestrina, InterAction; Eric Munoz, Oxfam America; Sara Nitz Nolan, InterAction; Avish Raj, ADRA; Claudia Sanchez de Lozada, InterAction; Stephanie Scholz, InterAction; and Ansley Vickers, CARE.

The Big Think drafting and coordination was led by Sara Nitz Nolan, Tom Buttry, Breanna Gomillion, Navya Nadimpalli, and Caroline Allen, with additional InterAction staff and leadership support.

ABOUT INTERACTION



Founded in 1984, InterAction is the largest alliance of international NGOs in the United States. We mobilize our Members to think and act collectively to serve the world’s poor and vulnerable, with a shared belief that we can make the world a more peaceful, just, and prosperous place—together.

Learn more at [interaction.org](https://www.interaction.org)



ANNEX 1: PROGRAM EXAMPLES

THE “3 RS” OF PROMOTING WOMEN’S ENGAGEMENT IN FOOD SYSTEMS

WORLD VISION



In its **USAID-funded Nobo Jatra** program in Bangladesh, **World Vision** uses multiple approaches to address the drivers of food insecurity. To promote Recognition (R1), the program worked with 200,000 households and local, regional, and national government structures to promote **improved nutrition** in a sustainable way. By recognizing the important role mothers and grandmothers have in food preparation, World Vision worked with them to better understand the health and nutritional needs of women of reproductive age, infants, and young children. To Reinforce (R2) using a **graduation model** that provided up to \$188 in cash grants for start-up capital, World Vision mentored 21,000 women in literacy, numeracy, financial management, and skills needs for various trades, many of them within the local food system. In this area of southwest Bangladesh, previously, only 15% of women participated in paid employment. On average, they earn \$54 to \$75 a month, a sizable amount in the area.

To Remove Barriers (R3) and address **sociocultural drivers and inequitable gender norms** in the production and nutrition domains, World Vision promoted more positive household relationships that improved the status of women in and out of homes. Men who think that women should be consulted on household budgeting and purchases rose from 43.3% to 79.6%, while those who think men and women should share household tasks rose from 8.3% to 53.5%. The project increased leadership opportunities for women to participate within influential community networks: food producer groups; village development committees; disaster management committees; water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) committees; and community clinic support groups.

INVESTING IN LOCALLY OWNED BUSINESSES GROWS LOCALLY OWNED FOOD SECURITY

CORUS INTERNATIONAL



Ground-Up Investing” is Corus’ impact investing practice. Unlike other impact investing efforts usually aimed at higher capacity companies that are not well connected to local communities, Ground-Up Investing targets early-stage businesses that are rooted in their communities and working to put people, the planet, and profit on equal footing. The project makes equity and debt investments in high-potential, early-stage, socially responsible companies and provides them with investment resources and technical assistance to grow their business, increase farmers’ incomes, and strengthen local economies. Ground Up Investing makes longer-term commitments and tolerates higher risk while they accompany talented entrepreneurs on their quest to reduce poverty, fight inequalities, and tackle climate change. Once recovered, funds are reinvested, extending and amplifying the impact of each dollar. As these companies grow, they are better able to access funding from other funders (impact investors, banks, etc.), making Ground Up Investing catalytic capital.

Ground Up Investing’s model is one way Corus is seeking to change relationships among development actors, away from prescribed roles of donors, implementers, and project participants to that of true partners with shared goals, risks, and investments with equal “skin in the game.” This is how Corus believes locally led development can be supported—by building a future generation of successful local enterprises that can scale economic growth and benefit communities and natural landscapes in ways that build resilience and sustainability, not just their own profit margins.

SHE TOLD US SO (AGAIN): WOMEN'S VOICES, NEEDS, AND LEADERSHIP IN COVID-19 CARE



CARE findings show that 73% of women are leading prevention systems for their groups and communities, compared to 40% of men who reported the same. Forty-seven percent of women and 50% of men said they are responding to COVID-19 by increasing community awareness around the need to take hygiene measures, respect social distancing, and fight misconceptions about the virus. In Burundi, women in village savings and loan associations (VSLAs) took the initiative to construct handwashing centers in their community and encouraged community members to wash their hands regularly. In Niger, men qualitative interviewees said that more women are engaged in community awareness raising and community COVID-19 prevention.

CARE is supporting local women's groups to take the lead in responding to crises that affect them and their communities through the **Women Lead in Emergencies (WLiE)** approach in five countries—Niger, Uganda, Colombia, the Philippines, and Mali. WLiE participants in refugee settlements in Uganda are increasingly being listened to as trusted voices within the community. They are 50% more likely to feel confident accessing services than women who aren't in the project. With the onset of COVID-19, women have used this role to promote COVID-19 prevention measures such as washing hands, wearing masks, and social distancing. VSLAs in Niger and Mali.

ANNEX 2: WHERE U.S. FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION PROGRAMS OPERATE

ASIA

	Food for Peace Emergency	Food for Peace Nonemergency (RFSA)	Feed the Future Target Countries	Food for Progress	McGovern-Dole	Nutrition Priority and Strategic Support Countries	Resilience-Target and Support Countries	US Global Water Strategy Target and Support Countries	Number of Programs
Bangladesh									7
Cambodia									3
India									1
Indonesia									2
Laos									2
Nepal									3
Pakistan									1
Philippines									3
Sri Lanka									2
Tajikistan									1
Timor-Leste									1

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

	Food for Peace Emergency	Food for Peace Nonemergency (RFSA)	Feed the Future Target Countries	Food for Progress	McGovern-Dole	Nutrition Priority and Strategic Support Countries	Resilience-Target and Support Countries	US Global Water Strategy Target and Support Countries	Number of Programs
Egypt									1
Jordan									2
Lebanon									1
West Bank and Gaza									1
Yemen									1

LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN

	Food for Peace Emergency	Food for Peace Nonemergency (RFSA)	Feed the Future Target Countries	Food for Progress	McGovern-Dole	Nutrition Priority and Strategic Support Countries	Resilience-Target and Support Countries	US Global Water Strategy Target and Support Countries	Number of Programs
Colombia									1
Dominican Republic									1
Ecuador									1
El Salvador									1
Guatemala									6
Haiti									6
Honduras									4
Nicaragua									2
Paraguay									1
Peru									1

EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA

	Food for Peace Emergency	Food for Peace Nonemergency (RFSA)	Feed the Future Target Countries	Food for Progress	McGovern-Dole	Nutrition Priority and Strategic Support Countries	Resilience-Target and Support Countries	US Global Water Strategy Target and Support Countries	Number of Programs
Georgia									1
Kyrgyzstan									1
Tajikistan									1
Uzbekistan									1

AFRICA

	Food for Peace Emergency	Food for Peace Nonemergency (RFSA)	Feed the Future Target Countries	Food for Progress	McGovern-Dole	Nutrition Priority and Strategic Support Countries	Resilience-Target and Support Countries	US Global Water Strategy Target and Support Countries	Number of Programs
Benin									1
Burkina Faso									6
Burundi									2
Cameroon									2
Central African Republic									1
Chad									1
Congo/Brazzaville									1
Côte d'Ivoire									2
Djibouti									1
DRC									6
Ethiopia									8
Ghana									5
Guinea-Bissau									2
Kenya									7
Lesotho									1
Liberia									3
Madagascar									6
Malawi									6
Mali									7
Mauritania									1
Mozambique									6
Niger									5
Nigeria									6
Rwanda									4
Senegal									6
Sierra Leone									1

Somalia									2
South Sudan									3
Sudan									1
Tanzania									6
The Gambia									2
Togo									1
Uganda									7
Zambia									3
Zimbabwe									3

Sources:

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- [Food for Peace Nonemergency](#) (RFS) 2022
- [Feed the Future Target Countries 2022](#)
- [Food for Progress 2022](#)
- [McGovern-Dole 2022](#)
- [Nutrition Priority and Strategic Support Countries](#)
- [Resilience-Target and Support Countries](#)
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